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Delgamuukw, also known as Earl Muldoe, suing on his own behalf Indexed as: Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
1997: June 16, 17; 1997: December 11. Present: Lamer C.J. and La Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé, Sopinka,1 Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA Constitutional law -- Aboriginal rights -- Aboriginal land title -- Claim made for large tract -- Content of aboriginal title -- How aboriginal title protected by s. 35(1) of Constitution Act, 1982 -- What required to prove aboriginal title -- Whether claim to self-government made out -- Whether province could extinguish aboriginal rights after 1871, either under own jurisdiction or through the operation of s. 88 of the Indian Act (incorporating provincial laws of general application by reference) -- Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35(1) -- Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5, s. 88. Constitutional law -- Aboriginal rights -- Aboriginal land title -- Evidence -- Oral history and native law and tradition -- Weight to be given evidence -- Ability of Court to interfere with trial judge's factual findings. Courts -- Procedure -- Land claims -- Aboriginal title and self-government -- Claim altered but no formal amendments to pleadings made -- Whether pleadings precluded the Court from entertaining claims. The appellants, all Gitksan or Wet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs, both individually and on behalf of their "Houses", claimed separate portions of 58,000 square kilometres in British Columbia. For the purpose of the claim, this area was divided into 133 individual territories, claimed by the 71 Houses. This represents all of the Wet'suwet'en people, and all but 12 of the Gitksan Houses. Their claim was originally for "ownership" of the territory and "jurisdiction" over it. (At this Court, this was transformed into, primarily, a claim for aboriginal title over the land in question.) British Columbia counterclaimed for a declaration that the appellants have no right or interest in and to the territory or alternatively, that the appellants' cause of action ought to be for compensation from the Government of Canada. At trial, the appellants' claim was based on their historical use and "ownership" of one or more of the territories. In addition, the Gitksan Houses have an "adaawk" which is a collection of sacred oral tradition about their ancestors, histories and territories. The Wet'suwet'en each have a "kungax" which is a spiritual song or dance or performance which ties them to their land. Both of these were entered as evidence on behalf of the appellants. The most significant evidence of spiritual connection between the Houses and their territory was a feast hall where the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en people tell and retell their stories and identify their territories to remind themselves of the sacred connection that they have with their lands. The feast has a ceremonial purpose but is also used for making important decisions. The trial judge did not accept the appellants' evidence of oral history of attachment to the land. He dismissed the action against Canada, dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for ownership and jurisdiction and for aboriginal rights in the territory, granted a declaration that the plaintiffs were entitled to use unoccupied or vacant land subject to the general law of the province, dismissed the claim for damages and dismissed the province's counterclaim. No order for costs was made. On appeal, the original claim was altered in two different ways. First, the claims for ownership and jurisdiction were replaced with claims for aboriginal title and self-government, respectively. Second, the individual claims by each House were amalgamated into two communal claims, one advanced on behalf of each nation. There were no formal amendments to the pleadings to this effect. The appeal was dismissed by a majority of the Court of Appeal. The principal issues on the appeal, some of which raised a number of sub-issues, were as follows: (1) whether the pleadings precluded the Court from entertaining claims for aboriginal title and self-government; (2) what was the ability of this Court to interfere with the factual findings made by the trial judge; (3) what is the content of aboriginal title, how is it protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and what is required for its proof; (4) whether the appellants made out a claim to self-government; and, (5) whether the province had the power to extinguish aboriginal rights after 1871, either under its own jurisdiction or through the operation of s. 88 of the Indian Act. Held: The appeal should be allowed in part and the cross-appeal should be dismissed. Whether the Claims Were Properly Before the Court Per Lamer C.J. and Cory, McLachlin, and Major JJ.: The claims were properly before the Court. Although the pleadings were not formally amended, the trial judge did allow a de facto amendment to permit a claim for aboriginal rights other than ownership and jurisdiction. The respondents did not appeal this de facto amendment and the trial judge's decision on this point must accordingly stand. No amendment was made with respect to the amalgamation of the individual claims brought by the individual Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en Houses into two collective claims, one by each nation, for aboriginal title and self-government. The collective claims were simply not in issue at trial and to frame the case on appeal in a different manner would retroactively deny the respondents the opportunity to know the appellants' case. A new trial is necessary. First, the defect in the pleadings prevented the Court from considering the merits of this appeal. The parties at a new trial would decide whether any amendment was necessary to make the pleadings conform with the other evidence. Then, too, appellate courts, absent a palpable and overriding error, should not substitute their own findings of fact even when the trial judge misapprehended the law which was applied to those facts. Appellate intervention is warranted, however, when the trial court fails to appreciate the evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating aboriginal claims when applying the rules of evidence and interpreting the evidence before it. Per La Forest and L'Heureux-Dubé JJ.: The amalgamation of the appellants' individual claims technically prevents a consideration of the merits. However, there is a more substantive problem with the pleadings. The appellants sought a declaration of "aboriginal title" but attempted, in essence, to prove that they had complete control over the territory. It follows that what the appellants sought by way of declaration and what they set out to prove by way of the evidence were two different matters. A new trial should be ordered. McLachlin J. was in substantial agreement. The Ability of the Court to Interfere with the Trial Judge's Factual Findings Per Lamer C.J. and Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.: The factual findings made at trial could not stand because the trial judge's treatment of the various kinds of oral histories did not satisfy the principles laid down in R. v. Van der Peet. The oral histories were used in an attempt to establish occupation and use of the disputed territory which is an essential requirement for aboriginal title. The trial judge refused to admit or gave no independent weight to these oral histories and then concluded that the appellants had not demonstrated the requisite degree of occupation for "ownership". Had the oral histories been correctly assessed, the conclusions on these issues of fact might have been very different. The Content of Aboriginal Title, How It Is Protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and the Requirements Necessary to Prove It Per Lamer C.J. and Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.: Aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures. The protected uses must not be irreconcilable with the nature of the group's attachment to that land. Aboriginal title is sui generis, and so distinguished from other proprietary interests, and characterized by several dimensions. It is inalienable and cannot be transferred, sold or surrendered to anyone other than the Crown. Another dimension of aboriginal title is its sources: its recognition by the Royal Proclamation, 1763 and the relationship between the common law which recognizes occupation as proof of possession and systems of aboriginal law pre-existing assertion of British sovereignty. Finally, aboriginal title is held communally. The exclusive right to use the land is not restricted to the right to engage in activities which are aspects of aboriginal practices, customs and traditions integral to the claimant group's distinctive aboriginal culture. Canadian jurisprudence on aboriginal title frames the "right to occupy and possess" in broad terms and, significantly, is not qualified by the restriction that use be tied to practice, custom or tradition. The nature of the Indian interest in reserve land which has been found to be the same as the interest in tribal lands is very broad and incorporates present-day needs. Finally, aboriginal title encompasses mineral rights and lands held pursuant to aboriginal title should be capable of exploitation. Such a use is certainly not a traditional one. The content of aboriginal title contains an inherent limit in that lands so held cannot be used in a manner that is irreconcilable with the nature of the claimants' attachment to those lands. This inherent limit arises because the relationship of an aboriginal community with its land should not be prevented from continuing into the future. Occupancy is determined by reference to the activities that have taken place on the land and the uses to which the land has been put by the particular group. If lands are so occupied, there will exist a special bond between the group and the land in question such that the land will be part of the definition of the group's distinctive culture. Land held by virtue of aboriginal title may not be alienated because the land has an inherent and unique value in itself, which is enjoyed by the community with aboriginal title to it. The community cannot put the land to uses which would destroy that value. Finally, the importance of the continuity of the relationship between an aboriginal community and its land, and the non-economic or inherent value of that land, should not be taken to detract from the possibility of surrender to the Crown in exchange for valuable consideration. On the contrary, the idea of surrender reinforces the conclusion that aboriginal title is limited. If aboriginal peoples wish to use their lands in a way that aboriginal title does not permit, then they must surrender those lands and convert them into non-title lands to do so. Aboriginal title at common law was recognized well before 1982 and is accordingly protected in its full form by s. 35(1). The constitutionalization of common law aboriginal rights, however, does not mean that those rights exhaust the content of s. 35(1). The existence of an aboriginal right at common law is sufficient, but not necessary, for the recognition and affirmation of that right by s. 35(1). Constitutionally recognized aboriginal rights fall along a spectrum with respect to their degree of connection with the land. At the one end are those aboriginal rights which are practices, customs and traditions integral to the distinctive aboriginal culture of the group claiming the right but where the use and occupation of the land where the activity is taking place is not sufficient to support a claim of title to the land. In the middle are activities which, out of necessity, take place on land and indeed, might be intimately related to a particular piece of land. Although an aboriginal group may not be able to demonstrate title to the land, it may nevertheless have a site-specific right to engage in a particular activity. At the other end of the spectrum is aboriginal title itself which confers more than the right to engage in site-specific activities which are aspects of the practices, customs and traditions of distinctive aboriginal cultures. Site-specific rights can be made out even if title cannot. Because aboriginal rights can vary with respect to their degree of connection with the land, some aboriginal groups may be unable to make out a claim to title, but will nevertheless possess aboriginal rights that are recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), including site-specific rights to engage in particular activities. Aboriginal title is a right to the land itself. That land may be used, subject to the inherent limitations of aboriginal title, for a variety of activities, none of which need be individually protected as aboriginal rights under s. 35(1). Those activities are parasitic on the underlying title. Section 35(1), since its purpose is to reconcile the prior presence of aboriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty, must recognize and affirm both aspects of that prior presence -- first, the occupation of land, and second, the prior social organization and distinctive cultures of aboriginal peoples on that land. The test for the identification of aboriginal rights to engage in particular activities and the test for the identification of aboriginal title, although broadly similar, are distinct in two ways. First, under the test for aboriginal title, the requirement that the land be integral to the distinctive culture of the claimants is subsumed by the requirement of occupancy. Second, whereas the time for the identification of aboriginal rights is the time of first contact, the time for the identification of aboriginal title is the time at which the Crown asserted sovereignty over the land. In order to establish a claim to aboriginal title, the aboriginal group asserting the claim must establish that it occupied the lands in question at the time at which the Crown asserted sovereignty over the land subject to the title. In the context of aboriginal title, sovereignty is the appropriate time period to consider for several reasons. First, from a theoretical standpoint, aboriginal title arises out of prior occupation of the land by aboriginal peoples and out of the relationship between the common law and pre-existing systems of aboriginal law. Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown's underlying title. The Crown, however, did not gain this title until it asserted sovereignty and it makes no sense to speak of a burden on the underlying title before that title existed. Aboriginal title crystallized at the time sovereignty was asserted. Second, aboriginal title does not raise the problem of distinguishing between distinctive, integral aboriginal practices, customs and traditions and those influenced or introduced by European contact. Under common law, the act of occupation or possession is sufficient to ground aboriginal title and it is not necessary to prove that the land was a distinctive or integral part of the aboriginal society before the arrival of Europeans. Finally, the date of sovereignty is more certain than the date of first contact. Both the common law and the aboriginal perspective on land should be taken into account in establishing the proof of occupancy. At common law, the fact of physical occupation is proof of possession at law, which in turn will ground title to the land. Physical occupation may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from the construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its resources. In considering whether occupation sufficient to ground title is established, the group's size, manner of life, material resources, and technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed must be taken into account. Given the occupancy requirement, it was not necessary to include as part of the test for aboriginal title whether a group demonstrated a connection with the piece of land as being of central significance to its distinctive culture. Ultimately, the question of physical occupation is one of fact to be determined at trial. If present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation pre-sovereignty, there must be a continuity between present and pre-sovereignty occupation. Since conclusive evidence of pre-sovereignty occupation may be difficult, an aboriginal community may provide evidence of present occupation as proof of pre-sovereignty occupation in support of a claim to aboriginal title. An unbroken chain of continuity need not be established between present and prior occupation. The fact that the nature of occupation has changed would not ordinarily preclude a claim for aboriginal title, as long as a substantial connection between the people and the land is maintained. The only limitation on this principle might be that the land not be used in ways which are inconsistent with continued use by future generations of aboriginals. At sovereignty, occupation must have been exclusive. This requirement flows from the definition of aboriginal title itself, which is defined in terms of the right to exclusive use and occupation of land. The test must take into account the context of the aboriginal society at the time of sovereignty. The requirement of exclusive occupancy and the possibility of joint title can be reconciled by recognizing that joint title can arise from shared exclusivity. As well, shared, non-exclusive aboriginal rights short of aboriginal title but tied to the land and permitting a number of uses can be established if exclusivity cannot be proved. The common law should develop to recognize aboriginal rights as they were recognized by either de facto practice or by aboriginal systems of governance. Per La Forest and L'Heureux-Dubé JJ.: "Aboriginal title" is based on the continued occupation and use of the land as part of the aboriginal peoples' traditional way of life. This sui generis interest is not equated with fee simple ownership; nor can it be described with reference to traditional property law concepts. It is personal in that it is generally inalienable except to the Crown and, in dealing with this interest, the Crown is subject to a fiduciary obligation to treat the aboriginal peoples fairly. There is reluctance to define more precisely the right of aboriginal peoples to live on their lands as their forefathers had lived. The approach to defining the aboriginal right of occupancy is highly contextual. A distinction must be made between (1) the recognition of a general right to occupy and possess ancestral lands and (2) the recognition of a discrete right to engage in an aboriginal activity in a particular area. The latter has been defined as the traditional use, by a tribe of Indians, that has continued from pre-contact times of a particular area for a particular purpose. By contrast, a general claim to occupy and possess vast tracts of territory is the right to use the land for a variety of activities related to the aboriginal society's habits and mode of life. As well, in defining the nature of "aboriginal title", reference need not be made to statutory provisions and regulations dealing with reserve lands. In defining the nature of "aboriginal title", reference need not be made to statutory provisions and regulations dealing specifically with reserve lands. Though the interest of an Indian band in a reserve has been found to be derived from, and to be of the same nature as, the interest of an aboriginal society in its traditional tribal lands, it does not follow that specific statutory provisions governing reserve lands should automatically apply to traditional tribal lands. The "key" factors for recognizing aboriginal rights under s. 35(1) are met in the present case. First, the nature of an aboriginal claim must be identified precisely with regard to particular practices, customs and traditions. When dealing with a claim of "aboriginal title", the court will focus on the occupation and use of the land as part of the aboriginal society's traditional way of life. Second, an aboriginal society must specify the area that has been continuously used and occupied by identifying general boundaries. Exclusivity means that an aboriginal group must show that a claimed territory is indeed its ancestral territory and not the territory of an unconnected aboriginal society. It is possible that two or more aboriginal groups may have occupied the same territory and therefore a finding of joint occupancy would not be precluded. Third, the aboriginal right of possession is based on the continued occupation and use of traditional tribal lands since the assertion of Crown sovereignty. However, the date of sovereignty may not be the only relevant time to consider. Continuity may still exist where the present occupation of one area is connected to the pre-sovereignty occupation of another area. Also, aboriginal peoples claiming a right of possession may provide evidence of present occupation as proof of prior occupation. Further, it is not necessary to establish an unbroken chain of continuity. Fourth, if aboriginal peoples continue to occupy and use the land as part of their traditional way of life, the land is of central significance to them. Aboriginal occupancy refers not only to the presence of aboriginal peoples in villages or permanently settled areas but also to the use of adjacent lands and even remote territories used to pursue a traditional mode of life. Occupancy is part of aboriginal culture in a broad sense and is, therefore, absorbed in the notion of distinctiveness. The Royal Proclamation, 1763 supports this approach to occupancy. McLachlin J. was in substantial agreement. Infringements of Aboriginal Title: The Test of Justification Per Lamer C.J. and Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.: Constitutionally recognized aboriginal rights are not absolute and may be infringed by the federal and provincial governments if the infringement (1) furthers a compelling and substantial legislative objective and (2) is consistent with the special fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the aboriginal peoples. The development of agriculture, forestry, mining and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, and the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are objectives consistent with this purpose. Three aspects of aboriginal title are relevant to the second part of the test. First, the right to exclusive use and occupation of land is relevant to the degree of scrutiny of the infringing measure or action. Second, the right to choose to what uses land can be put, subject to the ultimate limit that those uses cannot destroy the ability of the land to sustain future generations of aboriginal peoples, suggests that the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples may be satisfied by the involvement of aboriginal peoples in decisions taken with respect to their lands. There is always a duty of consultation and, in most cases, the duty will be significantly deeper than mere consultation. And third, lands held pursuant to aboriginal title have an inescapable economic component which suggests that compensation is relevant to the question of justification as well. Fair compensation will ordinarily be required when aboriginal title is infringed. Per La Forest and L'Heureux-Dubé JJ.: Rights that are recognized and affirmed are not absolute. Government regulation can therefore infringe upon aboriginal rights if it meets the test of justification under s. 35(1). The approach is highly contextual. The general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, through agriculture, mining, forestry and hydroelectric power, as well as the related building of infrastructure and settlement of foreign populations, are valid legislative objectives that, in principle, satisfy the first part of the justification analysis. Under the second part, these legislative objectives are subject to accommodation of the aboriginal peoples' interests. This accommodation must always be in accordance with the honour and good faith of the Crown. One aspect of accommodation of "aboriginal title" entails notifying and consulting aboriginal peoples with respect to the development of the affected territory. Another aspect is fair compensation. McLachlin J. was in substantial agreement. Self-Government Per The Court: The errors of fact made by the trial judge, and the resultant need for a new trial, made it impossible for this Court to determine whether the claim to self-government had been made out. Extinguishment Per Lamer C.J. and Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.: Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (the federal power to legislate in respect of Indians) carries with it the jurisdiction to legislate in relation to aboriginal title, and by implication, the jurisdiction to extinguish it. The ownership by the provincial Crown (under s. 109) of lands held pursuant to aboriginal title is separate from jurisdiction over those lands. Notwithstanding s. 91(24), provincial laws of general application apply proprio vigore to Indians and Indian lands. A provincial law of general application cannot extinguish aboriginal rights. First, a law of general application cannot, by definition, meet the standard "of clear and plain intention" needed to extinguish aboriginal rights without being ultra vires the province. Second, s. 91(24) protects a core of federal jurisdiction even from provincial laws of general application through the operation of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. That core has been described as matters touching on "Indianness" or the "core of Indianness". Provincial laws which would otherwise not apply to Indians proprio vigore are allowed to do so by s. 88 of the Indian Act which incorporates by reference provincial laws of general application. This provision, however, does not "invigorate" provincial laws which are invalid because they are in relation to Indians and Indian lands. Per La Forest and L'Heureux-Dubé JJ.: The province had no authority to extinguish aboriginal rights either under the Constitution Act, 1867 or by virtue of s. 88 of the Indian Act. McLachlin J. was in substantial agreement.
By Lamer C.J. Considered: R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139; St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 A.C. 46, aff'g sub nom. St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577; Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313; Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, [1980] 1 F.C. 518; Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; referred to: R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821; R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025; Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 107 A.L.R. 1; Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031; Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 751; Dick v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309; Stein v. The Ship "Kathy K", [1976] 2 S.C.R. 802; N.V. Bocimar S.A. v. Century Insurance Co. of Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1247; Schwartz v. Canada, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 254; Chartier v. Attorney General of Quebec, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 474; Kruger v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104; R. v. Taylor (1981), 62 C.C.C. (2d) 227; Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387; Uukw v. R., [1987] 6 W.W.R. 155; Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654; Roberts v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322; Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344; Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85; St. Mary's Indian Band v. Cranbrook (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 657; United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); R. v. Sutherland, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 451; R. v. Francis, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1025; Derrickson v. Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285. By La Forest J. Considered: Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313; Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654; R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672; R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; referred to: R. v. Wesley, [1932] 4 D.L.R. 774; Sikyea v. The Queen, [1964] S.C.R. 642, aff'g R. v. Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150.
Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91(24), 109.
Burn, E. H. Cheshire and Burn's Modern Law of Real Property,
14th ed. London: Butterworths, 1988. Gagne, Jocelyn. "The Content of Aboriginal Title at Common Law: A Look at the Nishga Claim" (1982-83), 47 Sask. L. Rev. 309. Hogg, Peter W. Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1992. Howard, Michael Newman, Peter Crane and Daniel A. Hochberg. Phipson on Evidence, 14th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1990. Macklem, Patrick. "First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination" (1991), 36 McGill L.J. 382. McLeod, Clay. "The Oral Histories of Canada's Northern People, Anglo-Canadian Evidence Law, and Canada's Fiduciary Duty to First Nations: Breaking Down the Barriers of the Past" (1992), 30 Alta. L. Rev. 1276. McNeil, Kent. Common Law Aboriginal Title. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. McNeil, Kent. "The Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada" (1982), 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 255. McNeil, Kent. "The Meaning of Aboriginal Title". In Michael Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada. Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 1997. Megarry, Robert E., and H. W. R. Wade. The Law of Real Property, 4th ed. London: Stevens, 1975. O'Reilly, James. "La Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, droit des autochtones" (1984), 25 C. de D. 125. Pentney, William. "The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada in the Constitution Act, 1982 Part II -- Section 35: The Substantive Guarantee" (1988), 22 U.B.C. L. Rev. 207. Sanders, Douglas. "Pre-Existing Rights: The Aboriginal Peoples of Canada". In Gérald-A. Beaudoin and Ed Ratushny, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2nd ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1989, 707. Sanders, Douglas. "The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada" (1983), 61 Can. Bar Rev. 314. Slattery, Brian. Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives
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66 Can. Bar Rev. 727. Stuart Rush, Q.C., Peter Grant, Michael Jackson, Louise Mandell and David Paterson, for the appellants and respondents on the cross-appeal, the Gitksan Hereditary Chiefs et al. Marvin R. V. Storrow, Q.C., Joanne R. Lysyk and Joseph C. McArthur, for the appellants and respondents on the cross-appeal, the Wet'suwet'en Hereditary Chiefs et al. Joseph J. Arvay, Q.C., Mark G. Underhill and Brenda Edwards, for the respondent and appellant on the cross-appeal, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia. Graham Garton, Q.C., Judith Bowers, Q.C., Murray T. Wolf and Geoffrey S. Lester, for the respondent the Attorney General of Canada. Arthur Pape, Harry A. Slade, Peter Hogg and Jean Teillet, for the intervener the First Nations Summit. Jack Woodward and Albert C. Peeling, for the intervener the Westbank First Nation. Marvin R. V. Storrow, Q.C., Joanne R. Lysyk and Joseph C. McArthur, for the interveners the Musqueam Nation et al. J. Keith Lowes, for the interveners the B.C. Cattlemen's Association et al. Charles F. Willms, for the intervener Skeena Cellulose Inc. J. Edward Gouge, Q.C., and Jill M. Marks, for the intervener Alcan Aluminum Ltd.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE -- I. Introduction 1 This appeal is the latest in a series of cases in which it has fallen to this Court to interpret and apply the guarantee of existing aboriginal rights found in s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Although that line of decisions, commencing with R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, proceeding through the Van der Peet trilogy (R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672, and R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723), and ending in R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821, R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, and R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, have laid down the jurisprudential framework for s. 35(1), this appeal raises a set of interrelated and novel questions which revolve around a single issue -- the nature and scope of the constitutional protection afforded by s. 35(1) to common law aboriginal title. 2 In Adams, and in the companion decision in Côté, I considered and rejected the proposition that claims to aboriginal rights must also be grounded in an underlying claim to aboriginal title. But I held, nevertheless, that aboriginal title was a distinct species of aboriginal right that was recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1). Since aboriginal title was not being claimed in those earlier appeals, it was unnecessary to say more. This appeal demands, however, that the Court now explore and elucidate the implications of the constitutionalization of aboriginal title. The first is the specific content of aboriginal title, a question which this Court has not yet definitively addressed, either at common law or under s. 35(1). The second is the related question of the test for the proof of title, which, whatever its content, is a right in land, and its relationship to the definition of the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) in Van der Peet in terms of activities. The third is whether aboriginal title, as a right in land, mandates a modified approach to the test of justification first laid down in Sparrow and elaborated upon in Gladstone. 3 In addition to the relationship between aboriginal title and s. 35(1), this appeal also raises an important practical problem relevant to the proof of aboriginal title which is endemic to aboriginal rights litigation generally -- the treatment of the oral histories of Canada's aboriginal peoples by the courts. In Van der Peet, I held that the common law rules of evidence should be adapted to take into account the sui generis nature of aboriginal rights. In this appeal, the Court must address what specific form those modifications must take. 4 Finally, given the existence of aboriginal title in British Columbia, this Court must address, on cross-appeal, the question of whether the province of British Columbia, from the time it joined Confederation in 1871, until the entrenchment of s. 35(1) in 1982, had jurisdiction to extinguish the rights of aboriginal peoples, including aboriginal title, in that province. Moreover, if the province was without this jurisdiction, a further question arises -- whether provincial laws of general application that would otherwise be inapplicable to Indians and Indian lands could nevertheless extinguish aboriginal rights through the operation of s. 88 of the Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5. II. Facts 5 At the British Columbia Supreme Court, McEachern C.J. heard 374 days of evidence and argument. Some of that evidence was not in a form which is familiar to common law courts, including oral histories and legends. Another significant part was the evidence of experts in genealogy, linguistics, archeology, anthropology, and geography. 6 The trial judge's decision (reported at [1991] 3 W.W.R. 97) is nearly 400 pages long, with another 100 pages of schedules. Although I am of the view that there must be a new trial, I nevertheless find it useful to summarize some of the relevant facts, so as to put the remainder of the judgment into context. A. The Claim at Trial 7 This action was commenced by the appellants, who are all Gitksan or Wet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs, who, both individually and on behalf of their "Houses" claimed separate portions of 58,000 square kilometres in British Columbia. For the purpose of the claim, this area was divided into 133 individual territories, claimed by the 71 Houses. This represents all of the Wet'suwet'en people, and all but 12 of the Gitksan Houses. Their claim was originally for "ownership" of the territory and "jurisdiction" over it. (At this Court, this was transformed into, primarily, a claim for aboriginal title over the land in question.) The province of British Columbia counterclaimed for a declaration that the appellants have no right or interest in and to the territory or alternatively, that the appellants' cause of action ought to be for compensation from the Government of Canada. B. The Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en Peoples (1) Demography 8 The Gitksan consist of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 persons, most of whom now live in the territory claimed, which is generally the watersheds of the north and central Skeena, Nass and Babine Rivers and their tributaries. The Wet'suwet'en consist of approximately 1,500 to 2,000 persons, who also predominantly live in the territory claimed. This territory is mainly in the watersheds of the Bulkley and parts of the Fraser-Nechako River systems and their tributaries. It lies immediately east and south of the Gitksan. 9 Of course, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en are not the only people living in the claimed territory. As noted by both McEachern C.J. at trial (at p. 440) and Lambert J.A. on appeal (at p. 243), there are other aboriginals who live in the claimed territory, notably the Carrier-Sekani and Nishga peoples. Some of these people have unsettled land claims overlapping with the territory at issue here. Moreover, there are also numerous non-aboriginals living there. McEachern C.J. found that, at the time of the trial, the non-aboriginal population in the territory was over 30,000. (2) History 10 There were numerous theories of the history of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples before the trial judge. His conclusion from the evidence was that their ancestors migrated from Asia, probably through Alaska, and spread south and west into the areas which they found to be liveable. There was archeological evidence, which he accepted, that there was some form of human habitation in the territory and its surrounding areas from 3,500 to 6,000 years ago, and intense occupation of the Hagwilget Canyon site (near Hazelton), prior to about 4,000 to 3,500 years ago. This occupation was mainly in or near villages on the Skeena River, the Babine River or the Bulkley River, where salmon, the staple of their diet, was easily obtainable. The other parts of the territory surrounding and between their villages and rivers were used for hunting and gathering for both food and ceremonial purposes. The scope of this hunting and gathering area depended largely on the availability of the required materials in the areas around the villages. Prior to the commencement of the fur trade, there was no reason to travel far from the villages for anything other than their subsistence requirements. (3) North American Exploration 11 There was little European influence in western Canada until the arrival of Capt. Cook at Nootka on Vancouver Island in 1778, which led to the sea otter hunt in the north Pacific. This influence grew with the establishment of the first Hudson's Bay trading post west of the Rockies (although east of the territories claimed) by Simon Fraser in 1805-1806. Trapping for the commercial fur trade was not an aboriginal practice, but rather one influenced by European contact. The trial judge held that the time of direct contact between the Aboriginal Peoples in the claimed territory was approximately 1820, after the trader William Brown arrived and Hudson's Bay had merged with the North West Company. (4) Present Social Organization 12 McEachern C.J. set out a description of the present social organization of the appellants. In his opinion, this was necessary because "one of the ingredients of aboriginal land claims is that they arise from long-term communal rather than personal use or possession of land" (at p. 147). The fundamental premise of both the Gitksan and the Wet'suwet'en peoples is that they are divided into clans and Houses. Every person born of a Gitksan or Wet'suwet'en woman is automatically a member of his or her mother's House and clan. There are four Gitksan and four Wet'suwet'en clans, which are subdivided into Houses. Each House has one or more Hereditary Chief as its titular head, selected by the elders of their House, as well as possibly the Head Chief of the other Houses of the clan. There is no head chief for the clans, but there is a ranking order of precedence within communities or villages, where one House or clan may be more prominent than others. 13 At trial, the appellants' claim was based on their historical use and "ownership" of one or more of the territories. The trial judge held that these are marked, in some cases, by physical and tangible indicators of their association with the territories. He cited as examples totem poles with the Houses' crests carved, or distinctive regalia. In addition, the Gitksan Houses have an "adaawk" which is a collection of sacred oral tradition about their ancestors, histories and territories. The Wet'suwet'en each have a "kungax" which is a spiritual song or dance or performance which ties them to their land. Both of these were entered as evidence on behalf of the appellants (see my discussion of the trial judge's view of this evidence, infra). 14 The most significant evidence of spiritual connection between the Houses and their territory is a feast hall. This is where the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples tell and retell their stories and identify their territories to remind themselves of the sacred connection that they have with their lands. The feast has a ceremonial purpose, but is also used for making important decisions. The trial judge also noted the Criminal Code prohibition on aboriginal feast ceremonies, which existed until 1951. III. Judgments Below A. Supreme Court of British Columbia (1) General Principles 15 The trial judge began his analysis by considering the significant cases in this area: St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577, Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, [1980] 1 F.C. 518 (T.D.), Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, and Sparrow, supra. On the basis of this jurisprudence, he set out four propositions of law. First, aboriginal interests arise out of occupation or use of specific land for aboriginal purposes for an indefinite or long, long time before the assertion of sovereignty. Second, aboriginal interests are communal, consisting of subsistence activities and are not proprietary. Third, at common law, aboriginal rights exist at the pleasure of the Crown and may be extinguished when the intention of the Crown is clear and plain. This power reposed with the Imperial Crown during the colonial period. Upon Confederation the province obtained title to all Crown land in the province subject to the "interests" of the Indians. Finally, unextinguished aboriginal rights are not absolute. Crown action and aboriginal rights may, in proper circumstances, be reconciled. Generally speaking, aboriginal rights may be regulated by the Crown only when such regulation operates to interfere with aboriginal rights pursuant to legitimate Crown objectives which can honourably be justified, without undue interference with such rights. Moreover, when regulating, government must be mindful of the appropriate level of priority which aboriginal rights have over competing, inconsistent activities. 16 With respect to the appellants' claims, McEachern C.J. divided his analysis into three parts: (1) jurisdiction over the territory; (2) ownership of the territory; and (in the alternative) (3) particular aboriginal rights over the territory. In the ownership claim, the appellants asserted they were "absolutely entitled to occupy and possess the individual territories" claimed (at p. 126). The claim to jurisdiction was understood by the trial judge as comprising jurisdiction over land and people in the territory, and amounted to aboriginal sovereignty, a right to "govern the territory free of provincial control in all matters where their aboriginal laws conflict with the general law" (at p. 128). Although the claim advanced at trial was advanced by individual chiefs on behalf of themselves or their House members, the trial judge held that since aboriginal rights are communal in nature, any judgment must be for the benefit of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples generally. (2) Aboriginal Ownership 17 McEachern C.J. started from the proposition, for which he cited St. Catharines Milling, that aboriginal rights are not proprietary in nature, but rather "personal and usufructuary", and dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign. He was satisfied that at the date of British sovereignty, the appellants' ancestors were living in their villages on the great rivers, in a form of communal society. He was satisfied that they were occupying or possessing fishing sites and the adjacent lands, as their ancestors had done for the purpose of hunting and gathering that which they required for sustenance. However, he was not satisfied that they owned the territory in its entirety in any sense that would be recognized by the law. 18 There were several specific claims of the plaintiffs as to their uses of the land before the assertion of sovereignty. He concluded that the appellants' ancestors lived within the territory, but predominantly at the village sites. He accepted, at p. 372, that they harvested the resources of the lands, but that there was only evidence of "commonsense subsistence practices . . . entirely compatible with bare occupation for the purposes of subsistence". He was not persuaded that there was any system of governance or uniform custom relating to land outside the villages. He refused to accept that the spiritual beliefs exercised within the territory were necessarily common to all the people or that they were universal practices. He was not persuaded that the present institutions of the plaintiffs' society were recognized by their ancestors. Rather, he found, at p. 373, that "they more likely acted as they did because of survival instincts". He stated that the maintenance and protection of the boundaries were unproven because of the numerous intrusions into the territory by other peoples. The oral histories, totem poles and crests were not sufficiently reliable or site specific to discharge the plaintiff's burden of proof. Although McEachern C.J. recognized the social importance of the feast system and the fact that it evolved from earlier practices, he did not accept its role in the management and allocation of lands, particularly after the fur trade. McEachern C.J. concluded, at p. 383, that "I cannot infer from the evidence that the Indians possessed or controlled any part of the territory, other than for village sites and for aboriginal use in a way that would justify a declaration equivalent to ownership". 19 Although he was of the opinion that the status of the villages and their immediate surrounding area may be different from the territory as a whole, they were already predominantly reserve lands. Hence, the question of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples' rights to these particular lands did not need to be dealt with. Moreover, to the extent that there were hunting grounds not included on those lands, McEachern C.J. believed he had no jurisdiction to extend their boundaries. (3) Aboriginal Sovereignty 20 McEachern C.J. interpreted the appellants' claim for "jurisdiction" as a claim to govern the territories in question. This would include the right to enforce existing aboriginal law, as well as make and enforce new laws, as required for the governance of the people and their land. Most notably, this would also include a right to supersede the laws of British Columbia if the two were in conflict. McEachern C.J. rejected the appellants' claim for a right of self-government, relying on both the sovereignty of the Crown at common law, and what he considered to be the relative paucity of evidence regarding an established governance structure. First, he stated, at p. 386, that when British Columbia was united with Canada, "all legislative jurisdiction was divided between Canada and the province, and there was no room for aboriginal jurisdiction or sovereignty which would be recognized by the law or the courts". Second, he characterized the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en legal system, at p. 379, as a "most uncertain and highly flexible set of customs which are frequently not followed by the Indians themselves". He continued, at pp. 379-80, stating: I heard many instances of prominent Chiefs conducting themselves other than in accordance with these rules, such as logging or trapping on another chief's territory, although there always seemed to be an aboriginal exception which made almost any departure from aboriginal rules permissible. In my judgment, these rules are so flexible and uncertain that they cannot be classified as laws. As a result of the flexibility and uncertainty of the customs and rules, McEachern C.J. rejected the appellants' claim to jurisdiction or sovereignty over the territories. (4) Aboriginal Rights 21 After rejecting the appellants' claim for ownership of and jurisdiction over the disputed territories, McEachern C.J. turned to the possibility that the appellants nevertheless have aboriginal rights exercisable therein. He set out, at p. 388, the four part test from Baker Lake for an aboriginal right: 1. That they (the plaintiffs) and their ancestors were members of an organized society. 2. That the organized society occupied the specific territory over which they assert the aboriginal title. 3. That the occupation was to the exclusion of other organized societies. 4. That the occupation was an established fact at the time sovereignty was asserted by England. McEachern C.J. noted that the requirement for an organized society had been satisfied, even though he did not believe the appellants' ancestors had institutions and governed themselves. However, he held that no specific level of sophistication ought to be required in satisfying this requirement. He then stated that there was evidence that the ancestors of the plaintiffs occupied specific locations in the territory (the villages) and they used surrounding lands. Although there was evidence that the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en would not have been able to keep invaders or traders out of their territory, no other organized societies had established themselves in the core areas on any permanent basis. Moreover, he noted at the outset of his reasons on this point that he was uncertain about the requirement for exclusivity. 22 The activities that were to be protected were only those carried on at the time of contact or European influence and that were still carried on at the time of sovereignty. This included "all those sustenance practices and the gathering of all those products of the land and waters of the territory I shall define which they practised and used before exposure to European civilization (or sovereignty) for subsistence or survival" (at p. 391). This did not include trapping for the fur trade, or other land-based commercial enterprise. McEachern C.J. ultimately concluded, at p. 395 that "the plaintiffs have established, as of the date of British sovereignty, the requirements for continued residence in their villages, and for non-exclusive aboriginal sustenance rights within [certain] portions of the territory". (5) Extinguishment and Fiduciary Duties 23 McEachern C.J. started with the proposition, at pp. 396-97, that the law "never recognized that the settlement of new lands depended upon the consent of the Indians". All aboriginal rights existed at the pleasure of the Crown, and could be extinguished by unilateral act. He accepted the "clear and plain" intention test for extinguishment, but took the view that it need not be express or even mention aboriginal rights, if the intention can be identified by necessary implication. An example of such implied extinguishment might be a fee simple grant to a third party, or a grant of a lease, licence, permit or other tenure inconsistent with continuing aboriginal interest. 24 McEachern C.J. held that any aboriginal rights to the land had been extinguished. The extinguishment arose out of certain colonial enactments which demonstrated an intention to manage Crown lands in a way that was inconsistent with continuing aboriginal rights. He stated, at p. 411, that "the Crown with full knowledge of the local situation fully intended to settle the colony and to grant titles and tenures unburdened by any aboriginal interests". Crown grantees who received land in colonial times were clearly intended to receive the land free from any aboriginal encumbrances. Moreover, this intention to extinguish did not only apply to lands that had actually been granted to third parties, but rather all Crown land in British Columbia. However, it should be noted that he was careful to distinguish between land and fishing rights. Since McEachern C.J. was of the view that all aboriginal title to the territories in question had been extinguished during colonial times, it was not necessary to consider whether the province had the power to extinguish aboriginal rights after Confederation. 25 Notwithstanding the complete extinguishment of all aboriginal rights in land, McEachern C.J. held, at p. 417, that the Crown was under a fiduciary obligation to continue to allow native persons to use vacant crown lands for lawful purposes until the land "is dedicated to another purpose". This is not an aboriginal "right", to which s. 35 can be applied, since any such "rights" over the land had been extinguished. However, he held that where the Crown extinguishes an aboriginal right, and makes a promise regarding use of Crown land at the same time, this creates the same fiduciary obligation as if the aboriginal people had surrendered the land to the Crown. In articulating guidelines for the application of the Crown's fiduciary obligation, McEachern C.J. made it clear that the Crown must be free to direct resource management in the province in the best interests of both the aboriginal and non-aboriginal persons in the province. However, Crown authorities should always keep the "aboriginal interests of the plaintiffs very much in mind" (at p. 423) in developing policies for the territory, and should ensure that aboriginal activities on the land are not unduly impaired. (6) Damages 26 Since the plaintiffs failed to establish that existing ownership, jurisdiction, or aboriginal rights had been breached, the claim for damages for wrongful appropriation of their territory was dismissed by McEachern C.J. (7) Lands Subject to Aboriginal Rights at Sovereignty 27 McEachern C.J. felt it necessary to delineate the boundaries of the lands that were subject to aboriginal rights at the time of sovereignty in case he was wrong that these rights had been extinguished. He considered the evidence regarding the external boundary of the territory, and the internal boundaries therein. He found numerous inconsistencies, and generally did not find it to be reliable. He rejected the boundaries as put forth by the appellants. 28 Nevertheless, since he had held that the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en had aboriginal sustenance rights over part of the land, he had to delineate their boundaries. He put forth three alternatives, and ultimately chose "Map 5" (at p. 400). This area recognized that the plaintiffs' ancestors likely used more distant areas in the territory. However, McEachern C.J. was not persuaded of such use in either the northernmost or southernmost portions of the territory. The northern boundary was drawn through the centre of the Skeena River, with 20 miles on the north side of the river being added. The southern boundary was drawn following some of the internal boundaries, but excluding several of the southern Wet'suwet'en individual territories. He selected this alternative because it worked less injustice for the Wet'suwet'en who lived more spread out and less concentrated near the rivers. However, he cut off the north and south portions of the claimed territory because he did not have confidence in the presence of the Gitksan or Wet'suwet'en in the areas north or south of the boundaries he drew. (8) Other Matters 29 McEachern C.J. concluded his reasons by rejecting the province's argument that the plaintiffs' aboriginal rights to some of the lands had been abandoned. He did not think courts should be quick to treat aboriginal lands as abandoned. He could not say with confidence which lands should be abandoned, and which should not, even though there was clearly declining aboriginal use of some of the lands. He also stressed that the onus of demonstrating abandonment rested with the province and that they had not discharged that onus. He also rejected the argument that the plaintiffs had waived their rights by accepting and using reserves and by conforming to the general law of the province. The honour of the Crown precluded the province from relying on this defence. (9) Final Order 30 In result, therefore, McEachern C.J. dismissed the action against Canada, dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for ownership and jurisdiction and for aboriginal rights in the territory, granted a declaration that the plaintiffs were entitled to use unoccupied or vacant land subject to the general law of the province, dismissed the claim for damages and dismissed the province's counterclaim. No order for costs was made. B. British Columbia Court of Appeal (1) Judgment of Macfarlane J.A. (Taggart J.A. concurring) 31 Macfarlane J.A. set out the following propositions of law which he indicated were the starting points for analysing aboriginal rights in land, which he garnered from Baker Lake, Calder, Guerin, Sparrow, and Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 107 A.L.R. 1 (H.C.). First, such rights arise from historic occupation and possession of the aboriginal peoples' tribal lands. Second, they arise by operation of law and do not depend on a grant from the Crown. Third, they are not absolute, but they are subject to regulation and extinguishment. Fourth, they are sui generis communal rights. Fifth, they cannot be alienated other than to the Crown. Finally, they are related to aboriginal activities which formed an integral part of traditional Indian life prior to sovereignty. (a)Ownership Rights 32 Examining the appellants' ownership claim, Macfarlane J.A. agreed that an exclusive right to occupy land is required to support a claim akin to ownership. He noted that the use of the term "ownership" (which was used in the plaintiffs in their pleadings) was unfortunate, since Guerin specifically held that the aboriginal interest does not amount to beneficial ownership. In his view, the trial judge properly applied the law to the plaintiffs' claim of ownership. Similarly, he found no merit in the appellants' challenge to the trial judge's findings of fact on a number of points. Although some of the areas of the evidence were cause for concern, he concluded that the issues required an interpretation of the evidence as a whole and that it would be inappropriate for this court to intervene and substitute its opinions for that of the trial judge. Hence, he did not disturb the judge's conclusion with regard to ownership of the territory, nor his conclusion that any interest which the appellants have in the land is not proprietary. (b)Aboriginal Sustenance Rights 33 Macfarlane J.A. canvassed the trial judge's findings regarding aboriginal sustenance rights. He noted that McEachern C.J.'s error in requiring a "time-depth" of a long time prior to contact in order to establish the rights did not affect his view of the territorial limits of the right. He agreed with the trial judge's application of the Baker Lake test. In particular, he viewed the significant question to be whether the practices were integral to aboriginal society or had only resulted from European influences. Macfarlane J.A. concluded that it would be inappropriate to intervene and substitute his view for that of the trial judge with respect to the weight of the evidence. Hence, if the appellants succeeded on the appeal with respect to extinguishment, they were entitled to sustenance rights in the area as identified by McEachern C.J. on Map 5. (c) Jurisdiction 34 Macfarlane J.A. essentially agreed with the trial judge with respect to his analysis of the jurisdiction, or sovereignty issue. He characterized the claim as the right to control and manage the use of lands and resources in the territory, as well as the right to govern the people within the territory, to the possible exclusion of laws of general application within the province. He stated that the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples do not need a court declaration to permit internal self-regulation, if they consent to be governed. However, the rights of self-government encompassing a power to make general laws governing the land, resources, and people in the territory are legislative powers which cannot be awarded by the courts. Such jurisdiction is inconsistent with the Constitution Act, 1867 and its division of powers. When the Crown imposed English law on all the inhabitants of the colony and when British Columbia entered Confederation, the aboriginal people became subject to Canadian (and provincial) legislative authority. For this reason, the claim to jurisdiction failed. (d)Extinguishment 35 Macfarlane J.A. began by noting that treaty-making is the most desirable way to resolve aboriginal land issues. However, he noted that prior to 1982, the rights of aboriginal people could be extinguished by the unilateral act of the sovereign, without the consent of the aboriginal people. Intention to extinguish must be clear and plain. Although express language is not strictly necessary, the honour of the Crown requires its intentions to be either express or manifested by unavoidable implication. Unavoidable implication should not be easily found -- it occurs only where the interpretation of the instrument permits no other result. This, in turn, depends on the nature of the aboriginal interest and of the impugned grant. 36 Macfarlane J.A. disagreed with the trial judge that the colonial instruments manifested the required clear and plain intention to extinguish all aboriginal interests in land. The purpose of the colonial instruments in question was to facilitate an orderly settlement of the province, and to give the Crown control over grants to third parties. It is not inevitable, upon a reading of the statutory scheme, that the aboriginal interest was to be disregarded. They did not foreclose the possibility of treaties or of co-existence of aboriginal and Crown interests. Similarly, even fee simple grants to third parties do not necessarily exclude aboriginal use. For example, uncultivated vacant land held in fee simple does not necessarily preclude the exercise of hunting rights. Moreover, it is clear that, at common law, two or more interests in land less than fee simple can co-exist. However, since the record was not sufficiently specific to permit the detailed analysis of such issues, Macfarlane J.A. suggested that these issues be dealt with in negotiation. He concluded that extinguishment by a particular grant needed to be determined on a case by case basis. 37 Macfarlane J.A. considered the constitutional power of the province to extinguish aboriginal rights after 1871, and in particular, whether valid provincial legislation could extinguish aboriginal rights in land by incidental effect. After 1871, the exclusive power to legislate in relation to "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" was given to the federal government by virtue of s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Valid provincial legislation may apply to Indians, so long is it is a law of general application and not one that affects their Indianness, their status, or their core values (Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031; Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 751; Dick v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309). However, the proposition that provincial laws could extinguish Indian title by incidental effect must be examined in light of federal authority relating to Indians and of the aboriginal perspective. The traditional homelands of aboriginal people are integral to their traditional way of life and their self-concept. If the effect of provincial legislation were to strip the aboriginal people of the use and occupation of their traditional homelands, it would be an impermissible intrusion into federal jurisdiction, as such a law would "trench on the very core of the subject matter of s. 91(24)" (at p. 169). Hence, he concluded that provincial legislatures do not have the constitutional competence to extinguish common law aboriginal rights. Moreover, extinguishment by adverse dominion could only be accomplished by the federal government. Similarly, s. 88 of the Indian Act did not assist the province. Laws of general application which do not affect the "core of Indianness" apply by their own force. However, provincial laws which do affect that core rely on s. 88, which referentially incorporates them into federal law. For s. 88 of the Indian Act to give the province authority to extinguish aboriginal rights, it would have to show a clear and plain intention to do so. Since no such intention exists in s. 88 in particular or the Indian Act in general, it cannot authorize outright extinguishment. However, it may authorize provincial regulation of and interference with aboriginal rights. Of course, now the operation of such regulations are now subject to s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. (e)Relief Allowed 38 Macfarlane J.A. granted a declaration that the plaintiffs' aboriginal rights were not all extinguished by the colonial instruments enacted prior to British Columbia's entry into Confederation in 1871. He also granted a declaration that the appellants have unextinguished, non-exclusive aboriginal rights, formerly protected at common law, and now protected under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. These rights are not ownership or property rights, and are located within the area indicated on Map 5. Their characteristics may vary depending on the particular context in which the rights are said to exist, and are dependent on the specific facts of each case. 39 Macfarlane J.A. did not grant a declaration with respect to jurisdiction over land and resources or people within the territory, leaving this to negotiation. He also did not interfere with the decision of the trial judge that the claim for damages must be dismissed. He noted that the parties wished to negotiate the precise location, scope, content and consequences of the aboriginal rights which the trial judge has held may be exercised in that part of the territory, the approximate area of which is illustrated on Map 5. However, no order of the court was required to permit the parties to enter into such negotiations. 40 Finally, Macfarlane J.A. stated that he would not give effect to the alternative declarations sought by the province relating to the alleged extinguishment of aboriginal rights by grants of fee simple and of lesser interests in the period from 1871-1982. The province did not have the power after 1871 to extinguish aboriginal rights. However, some provincial land and resource laws affecting aboriginal rights may be given force as federal laws through the operation of s. 88 of the Indian Act. The effect of fee simple and lesser grants on the particular aboriginal rights would require a detailed and complete analysis, which neither the record nor the submissions permitted. He made no order for costs, adopting the reasons of the trial judge. (2) Wallace J.A. (concurring) (a)Scope of Appellate Review 41 Wallace J.A. considered the appropriate principles for appellate review of a trial judge's findings of fact. An appellate court should find error on the part of the trial judge with respect to those aspects of the finding of facts which involve questions of credibility or weight to be given the evidence of a witness only if it is established that the trial judge made some "palpable and overriding error" which affected his assessment of the material facts. Such an error exists in three situations: firstly, when it can be demonstrated there was no evidence to support a material finding of fact of the trial judge; secondly, when the trial judge wrongly overlooked admissible evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court; or thirdly, where the trial judge's finding of fact cannot be supported as reasonable. In reversing the trial judge for "palpable and overriding error" the Court of Appeal must designate the specific error and state why the nature of the error justifies reversing the trial judge's finding of fact. Wallace J.A. held that these principles applied to the trial judge's determination of the nature and territorial scope of the aboriginal activities, the question of jurisdiction and control over the territory, and the weight to be attributed to the evidence of the various witnesses. (b)General Principles 42 Wallace J.A. stated that aboriginal rights of occupation and use originate in the Indians' historic occupation and use of their tribal lands, and is recognized by the common law. Unlike the trial judge, he recognized that these rights may resemble a proprietary title, not unlike those in western property law systems, or they may be restricted to certain uses of the land. He set out the requirements for establishing aboriginal rights, varying from the Baker Lake test used by the trial judge. In Wallace J.A.'s formulation of the test, the practices supporting the rights in question had to be integral to the claimants' distinctive and traditional society or culture. Moreover, he resolved the trial judge's concerns about the requirement of exclusivity as follows: if the plaintiffs claim exclusive occupation and use, the traditional occupation had to be to the exclusion of other organized societies. (c)Aboriginal Ownership 43 Wallace J.A. considered there to be reasonable support for the trial judge's conclusions regarding the nature and scope of the appellants' interest in the territory. The standard of occupation required to support the claim of ownership depended on the nature of the interest. The appellants' claim was to manage the lands and natural resources. This suggests exclusive control and possession of the territory, requiring the appellants to demonstrate exclusive possession. Since they could not do so, he concluded that the trial judge correctly dismissed their claim for ownership. (d)Aboriginal Rights of Occupation and Use of Traditional Lands 44 Even if the appellants' claim were characterized as a claim for aboriginal title, rather than ownership, Wallace J.A. agreed with the criteria applied by the trial judge: the occupation of specific territory, the exclusion of other organized societies, occupation at the time of British sovereignty and long-time aboriginal practices. Applying these principles to the trial judge's findings of fact, Wallace J.A. concluded that the appellants had not established a manifest or palpable error in concluding that the appellants' rights were non-exclusive, and confined to user rights. However, he was of the view that the court was not in a position to express an opinion on the specific territorial scope of these rights. (e)Aboriginal Jurisdiction or Self-Government 45 Wallace J.A. agreed that the claim for "jurisdiction" was for an undefined form of government over land and people in the territory, which would be paramount as against provincial laws in the case of a conflict. Wallace J.A. held, at p. 225, that this claim was "incompatible with every principle of the parliamentary sovereignty which vested in the Imperial Parliament in 1846". Moreover, British Columbia's entry into Canada in 1871 exhaustively distributed legislative power between the province and the federal government. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 could not revive and protect any sovereignty rights which the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en may have had. (f)Extinguishment 46 Wallace J.A. agreed with Macfarlane J.A. on this issue. He set out the test ("clear and plain intention") and decided that the rights of use and occupation discussed above had not been extinguished. (g)Miscellaneous 47 Wallace J.A. agreed that the appellants' damages claim should be dismissed, without deciding whether damages might be payable for wrongful interference with the Gitksan's and Wet'suwet'en's non-exclusive aboriginal rights in the territory. He also considered the appellants' claim that the appeal be adjourned in part for two years, during which time the parties would attempt to negotiate an agreement regarding the geographic parameters of the claimed territory. The court would retain jurisdiction to determine issues or refer them to the trial court if the parties failed to reach an agreement during the two-year period. However, he noted that the role of the Court of Appeal is not to tailor its judgment to facilitate negotiation. The Court of Appeal is restricted to declaring the legal status of rights claimed, on the basis of the trial record. (3) Lambert J.A. (dissenting) (a)General Principles 48 Lambert J.A. considered at length the leading cases with regard to aboriginal rights in British Columbia. He set out a number of conclusions. He recognized that aboriginal title and aboriginal rights are sui generis, and not easily explicable in terms of ordinary western jurisprudential analysis or common law concepts. He noted that aboriginal title is a form of aboriginal rights, and is therefore protected by s. 35. All rights arise from the practices, customs and traditions which form an integral part of the distinctive culture of the aboriginal people, and were part of the social fabric of aboriginal society at the time of the arrival of the first Europeans. This co-existed with the settlors' common law rights from the time of contact until sovereignty. After that time, aboriginal rights that continued as part of the social fabric of the aboriginal society were protected by both their own internal institutions and the common law. 49 Lambert J.A. believed that aboriginal rights were not frozen at the time of contact. Rather, they must be permitted to maintain contemporary relevance in relation to the needs of the holders of the rights as those needs change along with the changes in overall society. The rights may be individual, or they may be collective, depending on how they were and are treated by aboriginal people. Moreover, they do not come from aboriginal practice dating from time immemorial. Rather, they come, under the doctrine of continuity, from the practices, customs and traditions of the aboriginal people. 50 Aboriginal rights are neither abrogated by the fact that similar rights may be held by non-aboriginal people nor because the holders of the rights participate in the wage or cash economy. A right to occupy, possess, use and enjoy land to the exclusion of all others does not mean that it must be confined to the activities carried on in 1846, or that its exercise requires a renunciation of the contemporary world. (b) Extinguishment 51 Lambert J.A. considered the test for extinguishment from Calder, and expressly rejected Judson J.'s views. He derived the authority to do so from the way in which extinguishment was dealt with in Sparrow. In considering implicit extinguishment, he stated that it will only be held to occur where no other conclusion is possible from the particular instrument or conduct. It could not take place through adverse dominion. In the case of an inconsistency between a Crown grant of land and aboriginal title, the title should not necessarily give way in the absence of a clear and plain intention to extinguish. In any case, no grants or other interests were granted in the territory prior to 1871, and after that date, the British Columbia legislature had no power to legislate to extinguish, by adverse dominion, or otherwise. Lambert J.A. recognized, at p. 312, that because of s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, provincial legislation could not affect "Indians in their Indianness". This included aboriginal rights, since they are an integral part of aboriginal culture. This is not affected by s. 88 of the Indian Act. 52 Lambert J.A. applied the same principles to a consideration of whether the right to self-government had been extinguished. Neither the assertion of sovereignty nor the colonial enactments mentioned by the trial judge were sufficient to extinguish aboriginal rights in the claimed territory. He saw no incompatibility between statements that the Crown owned the land of the province and the notion that aboriginal title was a burden on the Crown's radical title. Moreover, there was no "inescapable inference" that the colonial enactments were intended to extinguish aboriginal interests. If this were the case, aboriginal peoples would instantly become trespassers on any lands not reserved for them as soon as the Crown took title. Finally, the evidence that the aboriginal peoples of northern British Columbia surrendered their title under Treaty No. 8 also suggested that they had title interests to surrender. (c)Findings at Trial 53 Lambert J.A. considered the factual findings made by the trial judge and made a number of general observations. First, if a finding of fact is necessary to the decision in the case, it should be given more deference than a fact which is merely made in the course of the decision or for some incidental reason. Second, findings of historical fact based on historical or anthropological evidence given by historians and anthropologists should be given only the kind of weight that other historians or anthropologists might have given them. These social scientists do not always agree, circumstances change, and new material is discovered and interpreted. Third, the appellants' oral evidence should be weighed, like all evidence, against the weight of countervailing evidence and not against an absolute standard so long as it is enough to support an air of reality. Fourth, with the election of an NDP government in British Columbia in 1991, the province reconsidered its legal stance in this case. As such, it invited the court to confirm the existence of aboriginal rights of unspecified content over unspecified areas and to permit the parties to negotiate the precise content and the precise areas. In Lambert J.A.'s view, the Crown, by adopting the position that it wished to negotiate the content and territorial scope of aboriginal rights, must be taken to have waived the argument that the findings of the trial judge must stand and that any aboriginal rights held by the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples must be confined to non-exclusive sustenance rights over the area covered by Map 5. In short, reliance on the findings of fact of the trial judge is entirely inconsistent with negotiation. 54 Nonetheless, Lambert J.A. was of the view that the findings of fact with respect to boundaries and with respect to the scope and content of aboriginal rights, including both rights in land and rights of self-government, cannot stand even in accordance with the usual principles governing the consideration of findings of fact, because they are flawed by errors of law. 55 With regard to the ownership claim, Lambert J.A. identified the following errors in the trial judge's reasons. In his view, the trial judge erred: (1) in not treating the ownership claim as a claim to aboriginal title and applied incorrect legal standards as a result; (2) in treating the claim to aboriginal title as a claim to a proprietary interest in land; (3) in applying a test of indefinite or long, long time use and occupation before the assertion of sovereignty; (4) in treating evidence of commercial interaction with the first Europeans as not being evidence of aboriginal practices; (5) in treating the rights to trap as being the exercise of rights other than aboriginal rights; (6) in rejecting evidence about commercial trapping and the evidence of Dr. Ray, a historical geographer who gave evidence at trial; (7) in rejecting possession, occupation, use, and enjoyment in a social sense as sufficient to establish aboriginal title; (8) in treating the test of possession and occupation as being whether there was a law which would have required a trespasser to depart; (9) in considering that aboriginal rights cannot be held jointly by more than one people; (10) in not concluding that aboriginal title could rest on occupation, possession, use, and enjoyment of land even though that occupation may have diminished in the period after contact; (11) in his treatment of blanket extinguishment of aboriginal title; and (12) in concluding that all aboriginal rights had been extinguished by the colonial instruments. These errors of law led to an incorrect conclusion on the part of the trial judge about the existence of aboriginal title. His findings of fact can be reconsidered on appellate review. 56 With regard to the jurisdiction claim, Lambert J.A. stated that the trial judge erred: (1) in treating the claim to jurisdiction as a claim to govern territory and assert sovereignty over the territory; (2) in trying to define the appellants' claim in terms of the answers given by one witness in cross-examination; (3) in concluding that the claim to jurisdiction must fail because the nature of aboriginal self-government and self-regulation was such that it does not produce a set of binding and enforceable laws; and (4) in considering that the existence of a legislative institution is an essential part of the existence of an aboriginal right to self-government. Because of these errors of law, the trial judge's conclusions were wrong. 57 With regard to the claim to aboriginal rights, Lambert J.A. was of the view that the trial judge erred: (1) in not treating the evidence of occupation, possession, use, and enjoyment of the territory in an organized way by the appellants for their purposes, but particularly for sustenance, as being sufficient to establish aboriginal title to much of the land within the territory; (2) in separating commercial practices of aboriginal people from other practices and saying that commercial practices were not aboriginal practices; (3) in not considering the evidence of trading practices with neighbouring peoples; (4) in his treatment of the question of exclusivity both in relation to aboriginal title and sustenance rights; and (5) in considering participation in the wage or cash economy in relation to the existence (or non-existence) of aboriginal title. Again, given these errors of law, Lambert J.A. asserted that an appellate court had jurisdiction to intervene and set aside the trial judge's findings. (d)Substituted Findings 58 In light of these errors, Lambert J.A. substituted his own findings of fact for those of the trial judge. In his view, the evidence established that in 1846, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples occupied, possessed, used and enjoyed their traditional ancestral lands in accordance with their own practices, customs and traditions which were an integral part of their distinctive culture. Those ancestral lands extend throughout the claimed territory, well beyond the area indicated in Map 5. In areas where there were no conflicting claims to user rights, the appellants' rights should be characterized as aboriginal title. In areas of shared occupancy and use, the appellants' title would be shared-exclusive aboriginal title. In areas where the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples did not occupy, possess or use the land as an integral part of their culture, they would not have title, but may have aboriginal sustenance rights. These rights were not extinguished through any blanket extinguishment in the colonial period. Precise legislation related to a specific area may have extinguished some rights. However, no such legislation was before the court. The geographic scope of the rights was a matter to be negotiated between the parties, and failing negotiation, needed to be determined by a new trial. 59 Lambert J.A. also concluded that in 1846, the appellants' ancestors had rights of self-government and self-regulation, which rested on the practices, customs and traditions of those people which formed an integral part of their distinctive cultures. It is true that the rights may have been diminished by the assertion of British sovereignty, but those rights that continue are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 60 Turning to aboriginal sustenance rights, Lambert J.A. stated that they are entirely encompassed within aboriginal title in those areas where Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en aboriginal title exists. They also may exist in areas outside of title lands. In areas where such rights were shared by a number of peoples, the appellants' rights may be limited to specific sustenance activities as opposed to exclusive or shared-exclusive use and occupation. (e)Other Issues 61 With regard to the Royal Proclamation, 1763, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 1, Lambert J.A. expressed no views on its application or effect in the claimed territory and its inhabitants. With regard to infringement or denial of the appellants' rights in the claimed territory, Lambert J.A. concluded that the evidence in the case did not permit a proper consideration of the issues. Each infringement or denial would have to be examined in relation to the specific circumstances. (f)Disposition 62 Lambert J.A. would have allowed the appeal, and made a number of declarations. First, he would declare that the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples had, at the time of the assertion of British sovereignty in 1846, aboriginal title to occupy, possess, use and enjoy all or some of the land within the claimed territory. The land covered by aboriginal title at that time extended far beyond village sites and the immediate areas surrounding. Second, he would declare that the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples may have had aboriginal sustenance rights, including hunting, fishing, gathering, and similar rights over any parts of the land within the claimed territory to which aboriginal title did not extend. He would also declare that the aboriginal title and the aboriginal sustenance rights described may have been exclusive to the Gitksan in certain areas and exclusive to the Wet'suwet'en in others, and in some they may have shared with each other, or other aboriginal peoples, or non-aboriginals. 63 Lambert J.A. would have also declared that the appellants' ancestors had, at the time of the assertion of British sovereignty in 1846, aboriginal rights of self-government and self-regulation relating to their own organized society, its members, its institutions and its sustenance rights. These rights were recognized by, incorporated into, and protected by the common law after 1846. They have not been extinguished by any form of blanket extinguishment. Hence, they exist in modern form, subject only to specific extinguishment of the specific title or specific sustenance right in a specific area. However, the right of aboriginal self-government did not include any rights that were inconsistent with British sovereignty, any rights that are repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience, and have not been modified to overcome that repugnancy, and any rights which are contrary to the part of the common law that applied to the territory, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples and their institutions. 64 Lambert J.A. would also declare that these aboriginal title rights, aboriginal rights of self-government and self-regulation, and aboriginal sustenance rights may have been subject, after 1846 to specific extinguishment by the clear and plain extinguishing intention of the Sovereign Power, legislatively expressed by Parliament. Any specific extinguishment of specific rights might have been express or implicit, and, if implicit, it may have been brought about by the legislation itself (implied extinguishment) or by acts authorized by the legislation (extinguishment by adverse dominion), provided the intention to extinguish was contained within the legislative expression and was clear and plain. Instances of such specific extinguishment could not be decided on this appeal. 65 Lambert J.A. would declare that the present aboriginal rights of self-government and self-regulation of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples, exercisable in relation to their aboriginal title, would include the specific rights claimed in this appeal by the plaintiffs in relation to aboriginal title. He would also declare that the present aboriginal rights of self-government and self-regulation of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples would include rights of self-government and self-regulation exercisable through their own institutions to preserve and enhance their social, political, cultural, linguistic and spiritual identity. 66 Finally, Lambert J.A. would remit a number of questions back to trial. These include the question of the territorial boundaries for both title and sustenance rights; the degree of exclusivity or shared exclusivity which the appellants hold, on both the territories over which they have title and the territories over which they have sustenance rights; the scope and content of the sustenance rights; the scope and content of the rights to self-government and self-regulation; and all questions relating to the plaintiffs' entitlement to damages and the quantum of damages. He would have also awarded the plaintiffs their costs, both in the Court of Appeal, and at trial. (4) Hutcheon J.A. (dissenting in part) (a)Rights to Land 67 Hutcheon J.A. agreed with the trial judge that the Royal Proclamation, 1763 did not apply to the territory or its inhabitants. Nonetheless, the policy reflected in the Proclamation was, generally speaking, acceptance of aboriginal rights to land. Moreover, Hutcheon J.A. concluded on the basis of Calder and Sparrow that the colonial enactments did not extinguish the aboriginal rights in the claimed territory. He found it unnecessary to decide whether a grant in fee simple extinguishes aboriginal title or whether entitlement to compensation arises in such circumstances. (b)Nature of the Rights 68 Hutcheon J.A. accepted that aboriginal rights to land existed prior to 1846 over the claimed territory. He found it sufficient to say, at p. 389, that aboriginal rights can "compete on an equal footing" with proprietary interests. Additionally, he noted that these rights are collective, inalienable except to the Crown, and extend to the traditional territory of the particular people. (c)Territory 69 Hutcheon J.A. disagreed with the trial judge's conclusion that the appellants' ancestors occupied or controlled only the villages in the territory and the immediately surrounding areas. In Hutcheon J.A.'s view, the trial judge misapprehended the legal test for occupation and disregarded the independent evidence which showed that the territory occupied or controlled by the appellants extended far beyond the villages. (d)Self-Regulation 70 The traditions of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples existed long before 1846 and continued thereafter. They included the right to names and titles, the use of masks and symbols in rituals, the use of ceremonial robes, and the right to occupy and control places of economic importance. The traditions also included the institution of the clans and the Houses in which membership descended through the mother and the feast system. They regulated marriage and relations with neighbouring societies. The right to practise these traditions was not lost, although the Indian Act and provincial laws have affected the appellants' right to self-regulation. Only negotiations will define with greater specificity the areas and terms under which the appellants and the federal and provincial governments will exercise jurisdiction in respect of the appellants, their institutions, and laws. (e)Disposition 71 Hutcheon J.A. would have allowed the appeal and have made a number of declarations. First, he would declare that all of the aboriginal rights of the appellants were not | |||